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Abstract—Here we advance the protection of split manufactur-
ing (SM)-based layouts through the judicious and well-controlled
handling of interconnects. Initially, we explore the cost-security
trade-offs of SM, which are limiting its adoption. Aiming to re-
solve this issue, we propose effective and efficient strategies to lift
nets to the BEOL. Towards this end, we design custom “elevat-
ing cells” which we also provide to the community. Further, we
define and promote a new metric, Percentage of Netlist Recovery
(PNR), which can quantify the resilience against gate-level theft
of intellectual property (IP) in a manner more meaningful than
established metrics. Our extensive experiments show that we out-
perform the recent protection schemes regarding security. For ex-
ample, we reduce the correct connection rate to 0% for commonly
considered benchmarks, which is a first in the literature. Besides,
we induce reasonably low and controllable overheads on power,
performance, and area (PPA). At the same time, we also help to
lower the commercial cost incurred by SM.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, chip manufacturing is a complex and costly pro-
cess, where more often than not third-party facilities are in-
volved. As a result, protecting intellectual property (IP) as well
as ensuring trust in the chips becomes challenging.
The IARPA agency proposed split manufacturing (SM) as
a protection technique to ward off threats like IP piracy, unau-
thorized overproduction, and insertion of hardware Trojans [1].
In the simplest embodiment of SM, the FEOL is handled by
a high-end, competitive off-shore fab which is potentially un-
trusted, while the BEOL is manufactured subsequently at a
low-end, trusted facility (Fig. 1). Hill et al. [2] successfully
demonstrated the viability of SM by fabricating a 1.3 million-
transistor asynchronous FPGA. Further studies also bear testa-
ment to the applicability of SM [3, 4, 5]. However, the overall
acceptance of SM remains behind expectations so far, mainly
due to concerns about cost.
The protection offered by SM is based on the fact that the
FEOL fab does not have access to the complete design, and an
attacker may thus be hindered from malicious activities. The
threat models for SM [6] are accordingly focused on FEOL-
based adversaries which either seek to (i) retrieve the design
and/or its IP, or (ii) insert hardware Trojans. Some studies also
consider both at the same time [7, 8]. Here, we address (i).
Prior art suggests splitting after M1, as such a scenario forces
an attacker to tackle a “vast sea of gates” with only a few
transistor-level interconnects provided along [3]. Although
splitting after M1 arguably provides the best protection, it also
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Fig. 1. Concept of split manufacturing, i.e., the separation of a layout into
the FEOL and BEOL parts. Note the different pitches across the metal layers.
As the FEOL part is outsourced, it may require additional protection (such as
placement perturbation or lifting of wires) against fab-based adversaries.
necessitates a high-end BEOL fab for trusted fabrication of all
remaining metal layers, including the lower layers with very
small pitches. Since this requirement may be considered too
costly, some studies propose to split after M4 [7, 9, 10].1 How-
ever, doing so can undermine security by revealing more struc-
tural connectivity information to an attacker [11, 12, 13].
The key challenge for SM is thus: how to render split manu-
facturing practical regarding both security and cost?
Here, we address this challenge with a secure and effective
approach for SM. Our key principle is to lift wires to the BEOL
in a controlled and concerted manner, considering both cost and
security. Our work can be summarized as follows:
• Initially, we revisit the cost-security trade-offs for SM. We
explore the prospects of wire lifting and find that naive
lifting to higher metal layers can improve the security al-
beit at high layout cost. Thus, we proclaim the need for
cost- and security-aware, concerted lifting schemes.
• We put forward multiple strategies to select and lift nets.
The key ideas to achieve strong protection are (i) to in-
crease the number of protected/lifted nets and (ii) to dis-
solve hints of physical proximity for those nets.
• Based on our strategies, we propose a method for the con-
certed lifting of wires with controllable impact on power,
performance, and area (PPA). Since we lift wires to higher
metal layers (M6, without loss of generality), our method
also helps to lower the commercial cost of SM.
1We advocate the terminology “to split after” instead of the commonly used
“to split at.” For example, “to split at M2” remains ambiguous whether M2 is
still within the FEOL or already in the BEOL. Further, the same uncertainty
applies to the vias of V12 and V23, i.e., those between M1/M2 and M2/M3,
respectively. Our definition for “to split after M2” is that M2 and V12 are still
in the FEOL, while the vias of V23 are already in the BEOL.
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• For the actual layout-level lifting, we design custom “ele-
vating cells.” Unlike the prior art, our techniques allow to
lift and route wires in a controlled manner in the BEOL.
• We promote a new metric, Percentage of Netlist Recovery
(PNR), which quantifies the resilience offered by any SM
protection scheme against varyingly effective attacks.
• We conduct a thorough evaluation of layout cost and se-
curity on finalized layouts for various benchmarks, in-
cluding the large-scale IBM superblue suite. We contrast
the superior resilience of our layouts with prior protection
schemes, and make our layouts publicly available, along
with the library definition for elevating cells [14].
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION FOR OUR WORK
A. On Prior Studies and Some Limitations
Attack Schemes: Naive SM (i.e., splitting a layout as is)
likely fails to avert skillful attackers. That is because physical
design tools arrange gates to be connected as close as possible,
subject to available routing resources and other constraints. Ra-
jendran et al. [11] introduced the concept of proximity attack
where that insight is exploited to infer undisclosed intercon-
nects. More recently, Wang et al. [12] proposed a network-
flow-based attack which utilizes further hints such as the di-
rection of dangling wires and constraints on both load capaci-
tances and delays. Magan˜a et al. [9, 10] utilized routing-based
proximity in conjunction with placement-centric proximity.
Protection Schemes: Various techniques have been put
forward to protect SM-based designs from proximity attacks.
Swapping of block pins was proposed by Rajendran et al. [11]
to obtain an unbiased Hamming distance of 50% between the
outputs of the original netlist and the outputs of the netlist re-
stored by an attacker. Wang et al. [12] proposed gate-level
placement perturbation within an optimization framework, to
maximize resilience and minimize wirelength overhead at the
same time. Sengupta et al. [13] also pursued various placement
perturbation techniques, along with a discussion on informa-
tion leakage for SM. Wang et al. [15] proposed a routing-based
protection scheme applying wire lifting, deliberate re-routing,
and VLSI test principles, all to tailor the Hamming distance
towards 50%. Magan˜a et al. [9, 10] advocated inserting rout-
ing blockages to lift wires and, thus, to mitigate routing-centric
attacks as those proposed in their study.
Besides those studies addressing proximity attacks, Imeson
et al. [16], Li et al. [17], and Chen et al. [18] focus on hardware
Trojans. Patnaik et al. [19] pursue BEOL-centric and large-
scale layout camouflaging; the authors note that their scheme
is also promising in the context of split manufacturing.
Limitations of Protection Schemes: The approach of Ra-
jendran et al. [11] is only applicable to hierarchical designs.
More importantly, pin swapping is rather limited in practice;
on average, 87% correct connections were reported in [11].
Placement-centric schemes would ideally (re-)arrange gates
randomly, thereby “dissolving” any hint of spatial proximity.
As this likely induces excessive PPA overheads [13, 16], place-
ment perturbation is typically applied more carefully [12, 13].
However, as we reveal in Sec. VI, overly restricted perturbation
can provide only a little protection, especially for splitting after
higher layers.
TABLE I
PITCH DIMENSIONS FOR THE METAL LAYERS IN THE 45nm NODE [11].
Layer M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10
Pitch (nm) 130 140 140 280 280 280 800 800 1600 1600
M1
M3
M5
M7
M1
M3
M5
M7
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. (a) Conceptional illustration of a regular, unprotected layout. The red
dots represent open pins, which would induce dangling wires once the layout
is split at each respective layer. Note that the majority of nets are completed in
lower layers, hence fewer open pins are observed for higher layers. (b) Con-
ceptional illustration of a layout protected by wire lifting. Here the majority of
nets are completed in M7 (without loss of generality). Hence, any split below
M7 induces many open pins to be tackled by an attacker.
Similar to placement-centric schemes seeking to limit PPA
overheads, some routing-based schemes such as [15] also pro-
tect only a small subset of the design (a few nets). These tech-
niques are further subject to available routing resources, and
re-routing may be restricted to short local detours which can be
easy to resolve for an advanced attacker. Besides, implicit re-
routing by insertion of blockages [9, 10] falls short of explicitly
protecting selected nets and controlling the routing of wires.
B. On the Trade-Offs for Cost Versus Security
It is challenging to determine the most appropriate split layer
as such a decision has direct and typically opposing impact on
security and cost. Recall that some prior art promoted to split
after lower metal layers. However, this comes at a high com-
mercial cost for the trusted BEOL fab. In contrast, splitting
after higher layers allows for large-pitch and low-end process-
ing setups at the BEOL fab, thus reducing cost (but possibly
undermining security). For example, considering the pitches
for the 45nm node (Table I), one may prefer to split after M3
(or M6, or even M8) over splitting after M1.2 Further aspects
promoting higher split layers are also discussed in [7].
When a net is cut across FEOL and BEOL by SM, at least
two dangling wires arise in the topmost layer of the FEOL.3
Dangling wires remain unconnected at one end; these open
ends indicate the locations where the vias linking the FEOL
and BEOL are to be manufactured (by the BEOL fab). We refer
to those via locations as open pins (Fig. 2). Further, we define
open pin pairs (OPPs) as pairs (pd, ps) where pd is connected
2Splitting after other layers is also possible, but considering cost and appli-
cability we suggest that any split should occur just below the next larger pitch.
This way, the BEOL fab has to manufacture only those larger pitches.
3The reverse is not necessarily true, i.e., not all dangling wires represent
a cut net—dangling wires may also be used for obfuscation. Such wires are
routed in the FEOL but remain open in the BEOL; see also Sec. III. Besides, the
number of dangling wires depends both on the net’s pin count and how/where
exactly it is cut. See also Fig. 6 for an illustrative example.
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Fig. 3. Percentage of netlist recovery (PNR, see also Sec. V) versus open pin
pairs (OPPs), plotted as a function of the split layer. Note that the split layers
are ordered from M10 to M1. The unprotected layouts are naively split as is
and the attack is based on [12].
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Fig. 4. PNR versus OPPs, plotted as a function of randomly selected nets lifted
to M6. The set of benchmarks and the legend are the same as in Fig. 3. The
protected layouts are split after M3 and the attack is based on [12]. The OPP
baselines (normalized OPP count of 1.0) are derived from each respectively
unprotected layout, i.e., where 0% of all nets are lifted.
to a driver and ps to at least one sink. The related routing is ob-
servable in the FEOL, but the true mapping of drivers to sinks
is comprehensible only with the help of the BEOL.
For an attacker operating at the FEOL, observing fewer
OPPs directly translates to a reduced solution space and, thus,
may lower her/his efforts for recovery of the protected design.
In Fig. 3, we plot an attacker’s success rate versus the OPP
count for various split layers. There are strongly reciprocal
correlations across the layers, confirming that layouts split after
higher layers are much easier to attack. That is because more
and more nets are routed completely within the FEOL once
we split after higher layers. Naturally, these FEOL-routed nets
yield no OPPs and, hence, impose no efforts for the attack.
One way to enforce many OPPs while splitting only after
higher layers is wire lifting, i.e., the deliberate routing of nets
towards and within the BEOL (Figs. 2 and 4). There is a com-
mon concern of overly large PPA cost for large-scale wire lift-
ing [8, 16]. We confirm this in Fig. 5, where we plot PPA over-
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Fig. 5. PPA overheads for naive lifting of randomly selected nets to M6. The
plot is based on the same benchmarks as in Fig. 3. The boxes span from the 5th
to the 95th percentile, the whiskers represent the minimal and maximal values,
and the black bars represent the medians, respectively.
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Fig. 6. The impact of lifting high-fanout nets on the number of open pin pairs.
heads for naive lifting of randomly selected nets.4 Note that
the die area is particularly impacted. That is because lifting
more and more wires in an uncontrolled manner induces no-
table routing congestion which, in order to obtain DRC-clean
layouts, can only be managed by enlarging the die outlines.
Overall, there is a need for an SM scheme ensuring a large
number of OPPs, while splitting after higher layers (at low
commercial cost), but without inducing excessive PPA cost. We
believe that such a scheme will expedite the acceptance of SM
in the industry. In this work, we propose such a scheme through
the notion of concerted wire lifting.
III. STRATEGIES FOR CONCERTED WIRE LIFTING
As motivated in Sec. II-B, the number of OPPs in the FEOL
should be as large as possible, but not at high cost—pertaining
to commercial and PPA cost. We tackle this problem with the
help of our custom elevating cells (ECs). The key idea of rout-
ing nets through ECs is to establish pins in the metal layer of
choice (above the split layer), thereby inducing OPPs for those
nets. (See Sec. IV and Fig. 10 for implementation details.)
Next, we introduce our strategies for concerted wire lifting.
They are based on exploratory but comprehensive layout-level
experiments. These strategies outperform naive lifting as well
as recent prior art regarding security while inducing only little
PPA overhead at the same time (see Sec. VI).
Strategy 1, Lifting High-Fanout Nets: We begin by lift-
ing high-fanout nets (HiFONs) for two reasons: (i) any wrong
connection made by an attacker propagates the error to mul-
tiple locations, and (ii) lifting HiFONs helps introduce many
OPPs. We define nets with two or more sinks as HiFONs.5
Consider Fig. 6 as an example. Here, a HiFON is origi-
nally connecting to four gates/sinks. Depending on how and
where the HiFON is lifted, the attacker has different scenarios
to cope with. In (a), only one OPP arises which is trivial to
attack/resolve. In (b), two OPPs are to be tackled, (A,B) and
(A,C). Assuming that an attacker cannot tell how many sinks
exactly to consider,6 either one of the two OPPs or both OPPs
at the same time are equally likely representing the original net.
4We implement naive lifting by placing one “elevating cell” next to the
driver; see Secs. III and IV for details on those cells and their use. Such naive
lifting enforces routing at least to some degree above the split layer, thereby
inducing OPPs and hampering an attacker’s recovery rate (Fig. 4). However,
naive lifting cannot handle OPPs in a controlled manner.
5Although large fanouts may be subject to timing-driven optimization such
as buffering or cloning [20], we found that on average 20–30% of all the nets
in the benchmarks we consider have a fanout of at least 2. In any case, our
techniques are generic and can be readily applied for any degree of fanout.
6While a skillful attacker may understand the driving strengths of any gate,
she/he cannot easily resolve their original use given only the FEOL. Any high-
strength driver may have to be reconnected either to many sinks nearby or
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Fig. 7. Distances for open pin pairs (OPPs). In (a), only a short distance arises
due to implicit wire lifting, whereas in (b) we precisely control the distance
using two elevating cells (ECs).
Thus, the attacker has three options to consider. In (c), even up
to 14 options arise; there are four OPPs (A,B), (A,C), (A,D),
and (A,E), as well as 10 possible combinations of those OPPs.
Naturally, once other nets are lifted as well, the set of OPPs
scales up even further, in fact in a combinatorial manner.
We lift all wires of any HiFON (Fig. 6(c)), to induce as many
OPPs as possible. We do so by inserting separate ECs for the
driver as well as for all the sinks.
Strategy 2, Controlling the Distances for OPPs: Besides
increasing the number of OPPs, it is also necessary to control
the distances between their pins. For example in Fig. 7(a), only
a short open remains in M5 for the lifted wire/net, motivating
an attacker to reconnect that particular OPP. Such a scenario
may arise for implicit wire lifting, e.g., as proposed in [9, 10].
There, only the FEOL metal layers to avoid are declared, but
the actual routing paths in the BEOL layers are not.
In our method, we can control the distances for OPPs at will,
simply by controlling the placement of the ECs (Figs. 7(b)). We
place ECs close to the driver and the sink(s), thereby enlarging
the distances and increasing an attacker’s efforts. To mitigate
any advanced attack, e.g., based on learning the distance dis-
tribution for OPPs while reverse-engineering other available
chips, one may also place the ECs randomly within (or even
beyond) the bounding boxes of the nets.
Strategy 3, Obfuscation of Short Nets: Above we assumed
that enlarging the distances of OPPs is practical and effective,
which is straightforward for HiFONs (as well as for relatively
long nets). For short nets, however, enlarging those distances
requires some routing detours out of the net’s bounding box.
Furthermore, short nets may be easy for an attacker to identify
and localize, based on the typically low driver strength. To
tackle both issues, we design another EC (Figs. 8 and 10(b)).
This EC places two pins close to each other: one “true” pin is
connected to the short net’s driver, and the other “dummy” pin
is connected to a randomly but carefully selected gate, repre-
senting a dummy driver. An attacker cannot easily distinguish
these two drivers: (i) the dummy driver is selected such that no
combinatorial loops would arise were the driver connected to
the short net’s sink(s), and (ii) we adapt both drivers’ strength,
also accounting for the routing detours, via ECO optimizations.
to few sinks far away. Given that wire lifting is conducted across the whole
layout, drivers and sinks of various nets will be “spatially intermixed,” notably
increasing an attacker’s efforts to map drivers to sinks correctly.
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Fig. 8. We obfuscate short nets by connecting the real and dummy driver to
another, dedicated type of EC. The dummy driver’s wire connected with the
EC is left dangling beyond the split layer. Note that the dummy driver is a real
driver for another net; the related wires are not illustrated here. Both drivers’
strengths are adapted such that they might seemingly connect to the sink of the
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thereby increasing the OPP distances.
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Fig. 9. The flow of our protection scheme.
Besides obfuscation, this EC induces a dummy OPP which nat-
urally increases the overall number of OPPs.
Note that we insert only one EC for short nets, specifically
between their real and dummy driver. We refrain from inserting
another EC near the sink of short nets, as we observed that
doing so contributes little for security but hampers routability.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Next, we discuss our methodology (Fig. 9), which is inte-
grated with Cadence Innovus using custom in-house scripts.
Given an HDL netlist, we first synthesize, place, and route the
design. The resulting layout is protected as follows. For each
net we wish to lift, elevating cells (EC) are temporarily inserted
next to the net’s driver (as well as next to all the net’s sinks for
HiFONs and long nets). It is important to note that ECs do not
impact the FEOL device layer; they are designed to solely ele-
vate/lift a given net. Next, we perform ECO optimization and
legalization based on customized scripts. Then, we re-route
the design, remove the ECs, extract the RC information, and
report the PPA numbers. In case the PPA budget allows for ad-
ditional wire lifting, we continue iteratively. Finally, a DEF file
split into FEOL/BEOL is exported for security analysis against
proximity attacks.
Strategy for Selecting Nets to Lift: In general, we lift nets
according to the strategies discussed in Sec. III. More specifi-
cally, considering the iterative flow outlined above, we take the
following steps to determine all nets to be lifted.
1. Given a ratio of nets to lift, we initially lift HiFONs and
then long nets using Strategies 1 and 2. Here we prior-
itize HiFONs based on their fanout degree; large-fanout
HiFONs are lifted first. Furthermore, it is easy to see that
the longer a net, the more freedom we have for controlling
its OPP distance(s), and the less likely it is for an attacker
(a) (b)
Fig. 10. Post-processed snapshots of our two types of ECs. Wires in M6 are
in orange, wires/vias in M1 are in blued/red. In (a), the EC (dark grey) is seen
overlapping an inverter (light grey, dotted). In (b), the EC is seen alone; this
EC has two inputs (C, D), as required for obfuscation of short nets. Recall that
the OPPs arise after the split layer, i.e., below M6—OPPs are not visible here.
to reconnect that net successfully. Therefore, we prioritize
nets not already lifted as HiFONs by their wirelength.
2. We then lift short nets using Strategy 3, until a given
PPA budget is utilized. We prioritize nets based on their
wirelength—the shortest nets are selected first. That is
because the shorter a net, the easier it is to successfully
reconnect by an attacker. Since the additional wires re-
quired to connect with dummy drivers consume notable
routing resources, we lift short nets in small steps of 10%
and iteratively monitor the PPA impact.
Design of Elevating Cells: As with any custom cell, our
ECs are embedded in a library of choice. We make our EC im-
plementation for the Nangate 45nm library publicly available
in [14]. Fig. 10 illustrates the two different types of ECs. The
key properties of our ECs are discussed next.
1. All I/O pins are set up in one metal layer. Since the pins
must reside above the split layer to effectuate wire lifting,
we implement different ECs as needed for various layers.
2. The pin dimensions and offsets are chosen such that the
pins can be placed onto the respective metal layer’s tracks.
This helps minimize the routing congestion.
3. ECs may overlap with any other standard cell (Fig 10(a)).
That is because the latter have their pins exclusively in
lower metal layers, whereas ECs neither impact those lay-
ers nor the FEOL device layer.
4. Custom legalization scripts have been set up to prevent the
pins of different ECs to overlap with each other.
5. Timing and power characteristics of a BUFX2 cell (buffer
with driving strength 2) are leveraged for the ECs. A de-
tailed library characterization is not required since ECs
only translate to some interconnects in the BEOL.
6. To enable proper ECO optimization, the ECs are set up for
load annotation at design time. That is required to capture
the capacitive load of (i) the wire running from the EC to
the sink and (ii) the sink itself. Note that this annotation is
also essential for obfuscating the dummy drivers’ strength
as outlined in Strategy 3 (Sec. III).
V. METRICS FOR LAYOUT PROTECTION
Here we discuss metrics to gauge the resilience of layouts
when accounting for FEOL-based attacks. First we review es-
tablished metrics and then we introduce a novel metric.
The Hamming Distance (HD) quantifies the average bit-
level mismatch between the outputs of the original and the at-
tacker’s reconstructed design [11]. Note that the HD reveals
the degree of functional mismatch, but not necessarily struc-
tural mismatches. (That is because any Boolean function can
be represented by different gate-level designs.) Hence, the HD
cannot adequately quantify the potential for gate-level IP theft.
The Output Error Rate (OER) indicates the probability for
any bit per output being wrong while applying a possibly large
set of inputs to the attacker’s netlist [12, 15]. As this metric
tends to approach 100% for any imperfect attack, it does not
reflect well on the degree and type of errors made by an at-
tacker, but rather whether any error was made at all. Like the
HD, it should not be used to quantify the gate-level resilience.
The Correct Connection Rate (CCR) is the ratio of con-
nections correctly inferred by an attacker over the number of
protected nets. For example, if 20 out of 100 protected nets
are correctly reconnected, the CCR is 20%. Note that Wang et
al. [15] defined an Incorrect Connection Rate (ICR), which is
simply the inverse of this metric. Unlike the HD or OER, this
metric can quantify the gate-level protection (or its failure).
Our metric Percentage of Netlist Recovery (PNR) captures
the ratio of correctly inferred connections over the total num-
ber of nets. It quantifies the structural similarity between the
original netlist and the attacker’s netlist. Thus, the PNR is more
generic and comprehensive than the CCR, as it accounts for the
entire netlist, not only for protected nets. Vice versa, the CCR
can be considered a special case of the PNR. For unprotected
layouts, both metrics shall be equal by definition.
For example, consider again that an attacker reconstructs 20
out of 100 protected nets, out of 10,000 nets in total. Now
consider further that an attacker can readily identify all nets
completely routed in the FEOL. Assuming that 2,000 nets are
routed in the FEOL, the PNR would be 20.2%. For 6,000
nets routed in the FEOL, however, the PNR would be already
60.2%—while the CCR remains 20% for both cases.
In short, the PNR quantifies (i) the overall potential of
IP theft and (ii) the resilience of any SM protection scheme
against varyingly effective attacks, and for varying split layers.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
Recall that we propose an SM scheme enabling a large num-
ber of OPPs while splitting after higher layers, and with con-
trollable PPA overheads. Hence, we evaluate our scheme thor-
oughly regarding security as well as layout cost.
Setup for Layout Assessment: Our techniques are imple-
mented as custom procedures for Cadence Innovus 16.15. Our
procedures impose negligible runtime overheads. We use the
Nangate 45nm Open Cell Library [21]; we utilize all ten metal
layers. The PPA analysis has been carried out at 0.95V and
125◦C for the slow process corner with a default switching ac-
tivity of 0.2. Timing results are obtained by Innovus as well.
Our ECs lift wires to M6 unless stated otherwise.
Setup for Security Analysis: We empower an attacker with
the FEOL layout and with the technology libraries. We do not
assume a working chip being available—it is yet to be manu-
factured. We utilize the network-flow-based attack provided by
Wang et al. [12]. Other attacks such as those in [9, 10] have not
TABLE II
TOTAL NUMBER OF OPPS WHILE SPLITTING AFTER M5. FOR A FAIR
COMPARISON, HERE WE LIFT WITHOUT LOSS OF GENERALITY 30% OF
THE NETS FOR ALL BENCHMARKS AND STRATEGIES.
Benchmark OPPsOriginal Naive Lifting Strategies 1 and 2 Strategy 3
c432 6 67 86 103
c880 8 116 170 204
c1355 6 120 147 164
c1908 13 142 219 269
c2670 112 228 356 315
c3540 53 386 576 458
c5315 196 582 845 780
c6288 38 1,235 1,590 1,630
c7552 127 533 900 795
been available to us at the time of writing.7 Functional equiv-
alence was validated using Synopsys Formality. The OER and
HD are calculated using Synopsys VCS by applying 100,000
random input vectors.
Benchmarks: We conduct our comprehensive experiments
using in total 28 benchmarks, selected not only from the “tra-
ditional” suites (i.e., ISCAS-85, MCNC, and ITC-99), but also
from the large-scale IBM superblue suite [22]. For the latter,
we leverage scripts from [23] to generate LEF/DEF files, but
we also use the Nangate 45nm library [21] while doing so.
Setup for Comparisons: The unsplit but protected, full lay-
outs of [12, 15] have been provided to us as DEF files. How-
ever, we were not made aware of (i) the intended split layer,
(ii) the selection of protected nets, or (iii) the library files. As
for (i), there are indications in the layouts that they have been
tailored for splitting either after M3, M4, or M5. Hence, we
calculate any comparative PNR values as average over those
layers. As a result of (ii), we cannot verify the other metrics
but simply quote them from the respective publications. Be-
cause of (iii) we cannot contrast PPA numbers.
Public Release: We provide our EC implementation in [14],
enabling others to protect their layouts likewise. Moreover, we
provide our final layouts as reference cases as well in [14].
A. Security Analysis
Increase in OPPs: Recall that more OPPs helps make prox-
imity attacks challenging, which is corroborated by a reduction
in PNR (Figs. 3 and 4). From our exploratory comparison of
lifting strategies in Table II it is apparent that our strategies
successfully increase the number of OPPs over both original
layouts and layouts where naive wire lifting is employed.
As it depends on the benchmark whether the lifting of Hi-
FONs and long nets (Strategies 1 and 2) or short nets (Strategy
3) induces more OPPs, we suggest to apply our strategies in
conjunction, as proposed in Sec. IV. Next, we confirm the su-
perior resilience of our strategies while evaluating the PNR.
On the Effectiveness of Our Scheme: Fig. 11 compares the
PNR for (i) naive lifting, (ii) lifting using our Strategies 1 and
2, and (iii) lifting using our Strategy 3. For a fair and com-
prehensive comparison, as with the exploratory comparison of
induced OPPs above, here we lift the same percentage of nets
7Given the focus on academic tools in [9, 10], we further assume that these
attacks are not readily compatible with our industrial design flow.
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Fig. 11. Comparison of PNR values for naive lifting and our proposed strate-
gies. The attack is based on [12]. The data reflects the average recovery/piracy
rate for splitting layouts after M3, M4, and M5.
TABLE III
COMPARISON WITH [15] ON AVERAGE PNRS (OVER M3, M4, AND M5)
FOR THE SAME NUMBER OF NETS SELECTED FOR PROTECTION. THE
ATTACK IS BASED ON [12].
Benchmark Protected Nets PNR for [15] PNR for Proposed Scheme
c432 34 87.5 70.7
c1355 74 84.8 60.1
c1908 56 91.2 58.9
c7552 66 93.9 70.2
(i.e., 30%) for all benchmarks. We derive the average PNR
while splitting the layouts after M3, M4, and M5.
We achieve an improvement (i.e., reduction of PNR) of 10–
11% for our strategies over naive lifting on average. Also here
we observe that it depends on the benchmark which lifting
technique is more effective. Thus, we apply our techniques in
conjunction for all remaining experiments—this helps to lower
PNR values even further (see below and Table IV).
Comparison with Prior Art: Initially, as a baseline com-
parison to the most recent work of Wang et al. [15], we protect
the same number of nets as they do, but the actual selection of
nets to protect/lift is based on our strategies. We achieve an
average improvement of ≈24% for the PNR here (Table III).
In Table IV, we contrast the schemes of [12, 15] and our
regular scheme, where the scope for protection/wire lifting de-
pends on the allocated PPA budgets (see also Subsec. B).
Naturally, original layouts without any protection are most
vulnerable, and an attacker recovers 96% of the netlist on av-
erage. Constrained placement perturbation as proposed in [12]
provides only little improvement, reducing the average PNR
to 95%. That is because routing eventually compensates for
any gate-level perturbation, with small displacements typically
being re-routed in lower metal layers (which may be readily
available to an attacker). The routing-centric scheme of [15]
can lower the PNR to 88.5%. In contrast, our scheme offers
significantly better protection—with 31% PNR on average, the
resilience improves by 57–64% over the prior art of [12, 15].
Besides the comparison based on our PNR metric, we also
contrast our scheme using established metrics (Sec. V). As for
the CCR, we note that the approach of [12] provides again
only little improvement (2.4%) over unprotected, original lay-
outs. The scheme of [15], however, achieves an improvement
of 21.9%, reducing the average CCR to 72.4%. Also here,
our approach provides superior protection, by means of 0%
CCR. Our scheme further achieves an optimal OER of 100%
(as is [15], but not [12]). Finally, we observe an average HD
of 40.3%. This translates to improvements of 25% and 11%
over [12] and [15], respectively, despite the fact that we do not
specifically target for optimal HD (50%) in our scheme.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON WITH ORIGINAL LAYOUTS AND PRIOR ART. WE CALCULATE ALL PNR VALUES AS AVERAGE OVER SPLITTING LAYOUTS AFTER M3, M4,
AND M5. CCR, OER, AND HD VALUES FOR ORIGINAL LAYOUTS, [12], AND [15] ARE ALL QUOTED FROM [15]; CCR IS DERIVED AS (100% - ICR).
WE ALSO REPORT OUR PPA COST. ALL VALUES ARE IN PERCENTAGE. THE ATTACK IS BASED ON [12].
Benchmark Original Layout Placement Perturbation [12] Routing Perturbation [15] Proposed Scheme
PNR∗ CCR∗ OER HD PNR CCR OER HD PNR CCR OER HD PNR CCR OER HD∗∗ Die-Area Cost Power Cost Delay Cost
c432 97.9 92.4 75.4 23.4 95.1 90.7 98.8 41.8 87.5 78.8 99.4 46.1 32.3 0 100 45.9 7.7 13.1 11.6
c880 100 100 0 0 95.3 96.8 15.8 1.2 86.8 47.5 99.9 18.0 28.3 0 100 39.8 0 12.1 19.9
c1355 98.3 95.4 59.5 2.4 97.2 93.2 94.5 8.0 84.8 77.1 100 26.6 32.8 0 100 46.1 0 12.2 21.3
c1908 98.9 97.5 52.3 4.3 96.9 91.0 97.8 17.7 91.2 83.8 100 38.8 29.5 0 100 48.1 7.7 14.6 18.9
c2670 89.6 86.3 99.9 7.0 94.3 86.3 100 7.5 86.3 58.3 100 14.0 34.3 0 100 35.1 7.7 10.0 12.0
c3540 93.8 88.2 95.4 18.2 88.5 82.6 98.8 27.9 86.2 77.0 100 36.1 30.8 0 100 46.4 7.7 5.0 2.8
c5315 91.7 93.5 98.7 4.3 94.1 91.1 98.7 12.5 87.7 74.7 100 18.1 31.6 0 100 35.4 7.7 7.9 16.9
c6288 97.0 97.8 36.8 3.0 95.9 97.6 74.2 16.5 92.1 80.9 100 42.1 35.6 0 100 N/A∗∗ 27.3 12.3 15.7
c7552 93.8 97.8 69.5 1.6 97.1 97.9 81.7 3.1 93.9 73.9 100 20.3 26.9 0 100 25.7 16.7 9.3 15.7
Average 95.7 94.3 65.3 7.1 94.9 91.9 84.5 15.1 88.5 72.4 99.9 28.9 31.3 0 100 40.3 9.2% 10.7% 15.0%
∗ By definition, PNR and CCR values for original, unprotected layouts shall be equal. For consistency, however, we report average PNR values here as well.
∗∗ The attack of [12] tends to provide netlists with combinatorial loops, hindering their simulation. Those netlists have been post-processed using scripts of [23]. For the benchmark
c6288, the post-processed netlist still fails simulation, due to “UNKNOWN” nets.
We also seek to compare with the work of Magan˜a et al.
[9, 10]. However, having no access to their protected layouts
of the IBM superblue benchmarks, we can only compare on a
qualitative level. In Table V, we contrast their and our counts
of additional vias above their assumed split layer, i.e., M4, and
up to M6, where we lift wires to in our scheme. Note that
only the total via counts across all layers before lifting and
the layer-wise differences in via counts after lifting are given
in [9], but not the original via counts per layer. Considering the
respective total via counts before lifting as independent base-
lines, our scheme increases the vias for V45 and V56 by 2.25–
3.71% (with respect to total vias), whereas Magan˜a et al. in-
crease those vias counts only by 0.67–2.03%.
In their recent study [10], Magan˜a et al. also report on the
relative vias increases per layer; we contrast their increases
with ours in Table VI. We observe on average 74% and 101%
more vias for V45 and V56, respectively, while the respective
increases reported in [10] are roughly only 16% and 49%. Note
that we achieve the underlying wire lifting while keeping the
die area fixed as in [10], i.e., we induce zero area cost (and
only marginal power and delay overheads, see also Subsec. B).
Any increase of vias above the split layer is a direct indi-
cation of more nets being routed in the BEOL, hence induc-
ing more OPPs and a higher complexity for proximity attacks.
Therefore, we believe that our scheme generally renders the
IBM superblue benchmarks more resilient.
B. PPA Analysis
Recall that we cannot directly compare to the works of Wang
et al. [12, 15] (and Magan˜a et al. [9, 10]). That is because we
have no access to the library (and DEF) files, and PPA cost are
not reported in the respective publications. As for our qualita-
tive comparison with Magan˜a et al. [9, 10], we also report our
PPA numbers on the large-scale IBM superblue benchmarks
(Table V). Notably, we observe only 0.85%, 0.83%, and 0%
overheads for power, delay, and die area, respectively.
We next discuss in detail the PPA cost as incurred for the
comparative experiments (Subsec. A, Table IV). Empirically,
we allow for different PPA budgets since large benchmarks
such as c6288 require more die area to maintain DRC-fixable
layouts (and reasonably low PNR values). The average bud-
gets for the experiments in Table IV are 10% for power and
die area, and 15% for delay, respectively. Using our flow and
given these budgets, we can lift on average 50–60% of all nets.
This ratio of lifted nets over PPA budgets is reasonable—that
is especially true in contrast to naive lifting (Fig. 5).
On Area: Recall that our elevating cells do not impact the
FEOL area. Besides, we initially set the utilization targets such
that less than 1% routing congestion can be obtained. When-
ever required to enable lifting, we stepwise increase die out-
lines, which is then reported as die-area cost.
On Power and Performance: As we move selected nets
to higher metal layers, an increase of wirelength is expected.
As a result, we also observe average overheads of 10.7% and
15.0% for power and delays, respectively. One can attribute
those reasonable overheads to the relatively low resistance of
higher layers. Once more and more nets are lifted, however,
that positive effect is offset by a steady increase of routing
congestion. Typically, congestion is managed by re-routing,
which lengthens nets further, aggravating the overheads further
to some degree. Besides, we conservatively estimate the im-
pact of dummy OPPs. That is because we consider the anno-
tated load of ECs, capturing the wires and sink, whereas only
the capacitance of the dangling wire has to be driven in reality.
On the Use of Additional Metal Layers: Finally, we ob-
serve that the PPA cost (and PNR) can be further improved
once additional metal layers are employed (Table VII). Here we
duplicate M6 two times, resulting in 12 layers in total. Also,
here we focus on relatively large and challenging benchmarks.
Additional metal layers can even provide a commercial ben-
efit for SM and wire lifting, as long as higher layers are used.
That is because the relatively low mask and manufacturing cost
of large-pitch, higher layers may be more than compensated for
by the achievement of zero cost for die area—this reduces the
overall footprint of SM on commercial cost significantly.
VII. CONCLUSION
We propose a BEOL-centric scheme towards concerted wire
lifting, advancing the prospects of split manufacturing (SM).
Besides, our novel PNR metric helps to properly quantify the
resilience against gate-level theft of intellectual property (IP).
The objectives we addressed here are (i) to enable splits after
higher metal layers, thereby reducing the commercial footprint
TABLE V
COMPARISON WITH [9]. FOR FAIR COMPARISON, WE ALSO ALLOW NO DIE-AREA OVERHEAD. WE REPORT PPA NUMBERS ON DRC-CLEAN LAYOUTS.
Benchmarks Implicit Wire Lifting [9] Proposed Scheme
Name Nets∗ Placement Total Vias∗ ∆+V45 ∆+V56 Total Vias∗ ∆+V45 ∆+V56 Power (mW) Delay (ns) Die Area (µm2)
Util. (%) Before Lifting After Lifting After Lifting Before Lifting After Lifting After Lifting After / Before After / Before After = Before
superblue1 879,168 69 4,597,616 40,051 (0.87%) 70,355 (1.53%) 6,679,733 247,739 (3.71%) 233,749 (3.50%) 82.7 / 81.9 29.8 / 29.4 1,520,868
superblue5 764,445 77 4,650,756 34,828 (0.75%) 62,704 (1.35%) 5,523,805 139,900 (2.53%) 133,052 (2.41%) 79.2 / 78.6 24.7 / 24.6 1,298,221
superblue10 1,158,282 75 6,304,110 42,210 (0.67%) 50,999 (0.81%) 8,875,439 228,454 (2.57%) 220,176 (2.48%) 116.3 / 115.5 29.8 / 29.5 2,176,080
superblue12 1,523,108 56 8,913,075 151,018 (1.69%) 175,614 (1.97%) 11,813,683 265,992 (2.25%) 274,908 (2.33%) 127.2 / 126.3 28.9 / 28.8 2,276,426
superblue18 672,084 67 3,582,687 45,417 (1.27%) 72,897 (2.03%) 4,852,381 164,971 (3.40%) 163,412 (3.37%) 81.3 / 80.4 19.7 / 19.5 1,158,182
∗ Values are different as we use Cadence Innovus whereas Magan˜a et al. [9] employ academic tools. Moreover, the metal layer corresponding to M10 in the Nangate 45nm library [21]
is missing for [9]. As the contribution for overall routing tracks from M10 is only 1.41%, the comparison can be considered fair nevertheless.
TABLE VI
COMPARISON WITH [10]. NOTE THAT OUR LAYOUTS ARE THE SAME AS
FOR TABLE V.∗
Benchmark
Implicit Wire Lifting [10] Proposed Scheme
∆+V45 (%) ∆+V56 (%) Wire Lifting ∆+V45 (%) ∆+V56 (%)
(in % of Nets)
superblue1 19.18 80.10 7 101.20 133.55
superblue5 9.43 29.84 5 57.53 76.33
superblue10 26.05 54.18 5 63.97 81.93
superblue12 9.72 32.40 5 55.73 80.27
superblue18 14.32 47.41 8 91.84 135.27
Average 15.74 48.79 6 74.05 101.47
∗ This implies that the percentage of lifted wires is the same in Table V. We simply
report it here due to lack of space in Table V.
TABLE VII
PPA COST AND PNR WHEN USING TWO ADDITIONAL METAL LAYERS.
THE ATTACK IS BASED ON [12].
Benchmark PNR Die-Area Cost Power Cost Delay Cost
c5315 28.1 0 2.9 3.3
c6288 34.5 0 7.2 5.6
c7552 24.6 0 3.5 4.3
Average 29.1 0 4.5 4.4
of SM, (ii) superior resilience, and (iii) reasonable and control-
lable PPA cost. We believe that schemes like ours are essential
to expedite the acceptance of SM in the industry.
We demonstrated exhaustively that our concerted lifting
scheme is more effective and efficient than naive lifting, both
in terms of protection and PPA cost. In our comparative anal-
ysis, we also found that our scheme excels prior art. For ex-
ample, we achieve 0% CCR for commonly considered bench-
marks (selected from ISCAS-85, MCNC, and ITC-99 suites),
whereas some prior art experiences CCR well above 70%. Be-
sides 0% CCR, we enable PNR as low as 31% on average. This
directly translates to much better IP protection than prior art,
which tends to experience 89% PNR or even more. Note that
we may further reduce the PNR by lifting more wires, at least
once higher PPA budgets are considered as acceptable.
For future work, besides employing other upcoming prox-
imity attacks, we will evaluate the resilience of our scheme
within a formal security model. Also, we will further study
the prospects of additional higher metal layers.
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